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Small Wars, Big Defense: 
Living in a World of Lower Tensions 
Murray Weidenbaum 
National policies for the 1990s - both for 
military and civilian needs - must be 
developed for a world that is vastly different 
from the past. It has become clear that 
decisions affecting war and peace cannot be 
made in isolation from the civilian economy. 
The willingness as well as the ability of a 
nation to support military preparedness is de-
termined by the complex interaction of a host 
of factors - domestic and international, politi-
cal, economic, and social. After all, the col-
lapse of the Soviet Bloc Is Warsaw Pact did not 
result from military action. 
The events since 1989 - at home and 
abroad- reenforce the need for a "new look" 
by the United States in setting national military 
strategy. Moreover, the way that national se-
curity policy is carried out strongly affects the 
civilian economy. 
The history of the past half century shows 
frequent start-and-stop cycles of defense 
spending. Those wasteful alternations often 
occurred as a result of hasty responses to dimly 
perceived changes in our national security po-
sition. 
On the positive side, it makes good sense to 
cooperate with the Russians to cut back on the 
size of both military establishments. Yet the 
United States should be prepared to reverse 
course for a variety of reasons. Parts of the 
former Soviet Union Is arsenal may fall into the 
hands of terrorist groups. Alternatively, a new 
Russian leadership could take a more ag-
gressive position. Moreover, serious military 
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threats may arise elsewhere, notably the Middle 
East. 
Effective reversibility requires a strong de-
fense industrial base as well as alert and well-
motivated reserve components. Clearly, the 
U.S. continues to live in a dangerous world, 
even though the nature of the danger changes. 
Adjusting to Lower Levels 
of Defense Spending 
The most reasonable basis on which to plan 
our own national security is to expect continued 
and substantial reductions in U.S. military 
spending for at least five years. The cutbacks 
will be more than the very modest 1-2 percent 
annual declines experienced in the late 1980s. 
Defense reductions of 5 percent a year or more 
are likely. Another way of looking at it is that 
a high level of military spending will continue 
for the indefinite future, but it will be much 
lower than peak rates experienced in the 1980s. 
This substantial, but curtailed, level of de-
fense outlay necessitates a variety of adjust-
ments, mainly painful to the people directly in-
volved. Yet, the general magnitude of the 
change will be less (as a share of the GNP) 
than was the case following the end of the Ko-
rean War or the Vietnam War. 
Five key policy decisions need to be made 
to facilitate these defense cutbacks. The longer 
these decisions are delayed, the more difficult 
the adjustments will be. 
Reduce Military Programs 
To fit within fiscal reality, President Bush 
and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney have 
to take those difficult actions that the Pentagon 
has avoided since the mid-1980s 
substantially reducing the number of aircraft, 
missiles, and ships the Defense Department 
buys and the number of people in uniform. 
The mismatch between the military's wishes 
and congressional appropriations can only be 
resolved in one way - by cutting the planned 
spending to fit the budget cloth. 
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Coming to grips with the budgetary chal-
lenge also will reduce the great uncertainty that 
currently hangs over planning in the defense 
industry - an uncertainty that affects the busi-
nesses, their employees and families. 
Some of the cuts that should be made are 
obvious. It is only bureaucratic inertia that has 
blocked them. For example, the Navy is still 
planning to spend $1 billion to build and outfit 
a series of additional "home ports" original I y 
designed to support a 600-ship fleet. 
The mismatch between the military's 
wishes and congressional appropriations 
can only be resolved in one way -
by cutting the planned spending 
to fit the budget cloth. 
The current fleet is less than 500 ships and 
further reductions are clearly in the cards. The 
support for continuing this expensive and 
needless effort comes from the cities where the 
new ports are scheduled to be built. We must 
be on our guard against born-again military 
enthusiasts. Local interest groups find it easy 
to confuse pork with patriotism. Do you want 
to convert a congressional dove to a hawk? 
Easy, just try cancelling a defense contract in 
his or her district. 
In voting lower appropriations for defense, 
the Congress should avoid setting in motion a 
new stop-and-go cycle in military spending. 
Serious threats to the national security are 
changing in form but they surely continue -
whether in the Middle East or elsewhere (such 
as the nuclear buildup of North Korea). 
Visions of peace dividends should not ob-
scure the need to maintain an adequate corps of 
professionals in the armed forces and key re-
serve units. While serving on the President's 
Military Manpower Commission in 1981-82, I 
learned what it takes to attract a quality mili-
tary force without bringing back the draft: pay 
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and perks at levels competitive with the civilian 
economy. The effectiveness of the large 
amounts of money and resources devoted to de-
fense will be enhanced by lowering the peaks in 
the military budget and raising the valleys. 
Maintain the Social Safety Net 
There is a great deal of uncertainty and con-
siderable fear in many localities concerning the 
future of the employees at defense plants and 
military installations. Yet, the most likely 
outlook is for the great majority of the people 
involved to keep their current jobs. Defense 
spending is going to continue at a high level, 
albeit much lower than now. 
Significant increases in unemployment are 
occurring in centers of defense production. 
More layoffs are expected. Being told by your 
employer that you no longer have a job, espe-
cially if you have worked for that company for 
a long period of time, is a traumatic experi-
ence. 
Many of the people involved went straight 
to work after graduation from high school or 
college. Involuntary unemployment is a new 
experience for them and often they are not even 
aware of the public and private mechanisms al-
ready in place to help them with the search for 
a new job and to provide some income to sup-
plement the savings they have accumulated. 
As a compassionate society, the United 
States provides a great variety of help to people 
caught in that situation. Experience with pre-
vious defense cutbacks tells us that the knowl-
edge that the government and particularly the 
community cares and is standing by to help is 
very important to the newly unemployed. 
Nevertheless, there is no justification for 
providing special benefits to unemployed de-
fense workers. They should be treated as gen-
erously as - but no more or less than -
people who lose their jobs because of sluggish 
housing sales resulting from a change in the 
government's monetary policy. 
The scientists, engineers, and technicians 
that constitute a large fraction of the defense 
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industry do not need federal "make work" pro-
grams. They are among the most mobile mem-
bers of the labor force - geographically, in-
dustrially, and occupationally. While defense 
is a national problem, economic adjustment is 
largely local. In any event, adjustment to de-
fense cutbacks is best initiated in the private 
sector. 
Adjustment to defense cutbacks is best 
initiated in the private sector. 
Many defense-oriented communities take the 
position that the nation owes them something 
special because of their "contributions" to the 
national defense. When we recall the vigorous 
lobbying efforts those same communities made 
to get the Pentagon to locate the defense con-
tract in their locality in the first place, we must 
dismiss such obviously self-serving views. 
Government decision makers must learn to 
refrain from jumping every time a constituent 
gripes. The experience at Fort Wolters in cen-
tral Texas furnishes a cogent case in point. 
When the base closing was announced in 1973, 
the Fort Worth Star-Telegram headlined the 
story as "Economic Rape." Looking back 
now, several thousand new jobs were created 
by businesses moving into the base. The 
current local reaction is very different. The 
mayor of the nearby town, Mineral Wells, was 
recently quoted as saying, "That post couldn't 
be reactivated now. The people here wouldn't 
stand for it. " 
The unpleasant fact is that recessions (albeit 
mild and short) followed the end of the Korean 
and Vietnam Wars and have accompanied the 
current defense cutback. The defense cutbacks 
likely in the next several years are relatively 
modest- a fraction of one percent of GNP in 
any one year. We should rei y on the Federal 
Reserve System to offset that economic void. 
The Fed is the most effective mechanism for in-
fluencing short-term economic developments. 
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Neither of these fears - employment cuts 
or recession - should deter the movement to a 
lower level of defense spending. The prosper-
ity of the United States does not require any 
particular amount of military activity. The 
productivity and competitiveness of the Ameri-
can economy will suffer if defense spending is 
used to prop up the prosperity of any region or 
industry. 
Maintain Support for R & D 
Because the military is such a large pro-
moter of science and technology, a reduction in 
defense spending means a cutback in total fed-
eral support for research and development 
(R&D). That curtailment of investment in sci-
ence and technology is troublesome for reasons 
that extend far beyond the military. Study after 
study shows that R&D is a major contributor to 
economic growth and rising living standards. 
Moreover, the high-tech industries, which in 
many cases are almost synonymous with the 
major defense contractors, are unique in pro-
viding a surplus of exports over imports, year 
after year. 
There are some sensible things that govern-
ment can do to shore up the high-technology 
sectors without spending a lot of money. The 
Department of Defense should reduce the barri-
ers it has erected between defense and commer-
cial technology. Greater consolidation of mili-
tary and industrial product specifications would 
be especially helpful. Increasing the procure-
ment of commercially produced high-tech 
products will strengthen the private-sector base 
for innovation. 
The one area where some additional gov-
ernment spending is justified is research, espe-
cially basic research. Because so much of the 
results show up in the open literature, the firms 
doing and paying for the work rarely have 
rights to the knowledge being generated. Yet 
society as a whole benefits substantially. Un-
der the circumstances, universities, research in-
stitutes, and civilian government agencies need 
to be encouraged to fill the funding gap opened 
by defense budget reductions. 
6 
Remove Government Obstacles 
We need a viable group of experienced 
companies and highly skilled people to meet 
current defense needs and to provide a base for 
expansion should the international outlook 
worsen substantially. The major defense prime 
contractors and subcontractors as a group also 
constitute a key part of this nation's capability 
for industrial innovation. 
A major decline in the size of the military 
market is the proper time to administer a 
massive dose of deregulation to the 
military procurement process. 
How do we do that without massive subsi-
dies? The Congressional Joint Economic 
Committee held a hearing in September 1991 
on proposals to do just that. I repeated my 
standard advice to Capitol Hill, "Don't just 
stand there, undo something. " It is ironic that 
Congress continues to tighten its regulation of 
defense companies, and of business generally, 
just as Eastern European nations throw off the 
shackles of governmental controls so that they 
can move closer to that free economy that they 
associate with the United States. 
The sad fact is that American business, mil-
itary and civilian, is faced with a major expan-
sion of expensive and burdensome regulatory 
legislation. A major decline in the size of the 
military market is the proper time to administer 
a massive dose of deregulation to the military 
procurement process. That would reduce the 
overhead costs of defense contractors. It would 
also increase their ability to transfer new tech-
nology between civilian and military products. 
Congress should strip out the host of special 
provisions that require military contractors to 
act more like government bureaus doling out 
benefits to designated classes of beneficiaries 
than private enterprises that are expected to 
provide innovation and technological progress. 
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As an alumnus of the military-industrial 
complex, I feel obliged to report that the Pen-
tagon is the place where Franz Kafka meets 
Alice in Wonderland. For sugar cookies, mil-
itary specifications run to fifteen pages. For a 
cargo plane, companies vying for a contract 
wrote a total of 240,000 pages of material -
weighing three-and-a-half tons. 
Piecemeal procurement changes have failed. 
The place to start is a sweeping overhaul of the 
entire process. The Pentagon should eliminate 
the 2,000 pages of existing procurement regu-
lations, including 500 pages of standard clauses 
and the 300 pages of forms. 
Review authority over procurement pro-
grams (mainly to say no) is dispersed among 40 
contract officers, staff experts, senior military 
executives, auditors and inspectors. None of 
these "second guessers" has responsibility for 
the program's success and most of these posi-
tions should be eliminated. 
Comprehensive reform means dividing mil-
itary procurement into two categories: items 
available in the private sector and weapons. 
The great majority of military purchases should 
be made without all the rigamarole. 
The nation pays for bureaucratic wheelspin-
ning in many ways - such as unnecessary de-
lay. As a result, 8-12 years are now required 
to develop and produce a new military aircraft. 
Not surprisingly, much of the equipment is out 
of date before the plane goes into use. The 
Pentagon should award the contracts to the 
firms that do well on earlier production pro-
grams - rather than those that are skillful at 
drawing up proposals or merely "buying in" at 
initial low prices. 
Most important, we can raise the effective-
ness of the money that is spent on military pro-
curement by removing the myriad of restraints 
and directives imposed by members of Con-
gress anxious to protect the defense jobs lo-
cated in their states or districts. Forcing the 
military to buy weapons they do not need is the 
most inefficient way of providing benefits to 
constituents. It sets the wrong tone for all that 
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follows. After all, how can the people respon-
sible for military acquisition be expected to 
follow the highest ethical principles when the 
entire process is designed by members of 
Congress who treat the military budget as the 
nation's biggest pork barrel? 
Defense Companies Must Downsize 
Defense companies need to continue the 
substantial and painful downsizing now under-
way. They must maintain the financial ability 
to operate in a different market environment -
or they will go under. 
Most economic conversion proposals, sad to 
say are characterized by naivete and wishful thi~ing. At best they are a diversion. At 
worst, they will dissipate the remaining assets 
of defense contractors. The numerous past at-
tempts by defense contractors to use their facto-
ries and people to penetrate civilian markets 
have resulted in few successes. The abandoned 
projects literally run the gamut from canoes to 
coffins. Most of the undertakings have failed, 
either being closed down or sold at a loss. De-
fense companies are different from civilian 
companies. Procter & Gamble cannot make 
missiles and General Dynamics cannot produce 
soap or potato chips (at least not at competitive 
prices). 
Trying to get commercial payoffs from mil-
itary technology is invariably an enticing con-
cept. But the past sad history of the attempts 
of the major military contractors to enter com-
mercial markets underscores the need for gov-
ernment to refrain from trying to forcefeed that 
process. 
Individual defense firms need to understand 
that like companies in other industries, they hav~ no particular claim to maintaining their 
present size, or even to their continued exis-
tence - nor do their employees possess any 
special rights to the jobs now generated .by de-
fense spending. Most of these firms wtll find 
that a more modest scale of operations is also a 
more efficient scale in the decade ahead. 
This advice is consistent with the response 
of the chairman of Martin Marietta when asked 
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by the Soviets how to convert a tank plant into 
a refrigerator factory: tear down the tank plant 
and build a new refrigerator factory. 
The federal government should focus on 
developing sensible monetary and fiscal 
policy and reducing tax and regulatory 
obstacles to economic activity. 
Forcing defense contractors to try to pene-
trate markets that are alien to them is no favor 
to their employees - who would find 
themselves abruptly laid off when those 
ventures visibly failed. Those now out of work 
are better advised to seek employment 
elsewhere. It is foolhardy to ignore the 
evidence. As a typical study of past experience 
by Battelle Memorial Institute concluded: 
"Detailed research has not identified even one 
successful product in our economy today which 
was developed through a military-to-civilian 
conversion approach." 
Conclusion 
The American economy can adjust success-
fully to the defense cutbacks likely to occur in 
the 1990s. Defense is a minor player in the 
overall American economy. It accounts for 
one-fifteenth of the GNP and an even smaller 
portion of the work force. Economic activity 
in the U.S. marches to the beat of civilian 
drummers. 
Key economic changes will occur in the pri-
vate sector as people and capital move from 
military to civilian production. The major de-
fense contractors face a reduction of about one-
third from their present size. 
In an economy such as that of the United 
States, organized primarily along the lines of 
private enterprise, the basic responsibility for 
adjusting to losing a job or suffering a reduc-
10 
tion of business income falls on the individuals 
directly affected. Given the incentives (positive 
and negative) provided by the marketplace, 
those adjustments will best be made if that ba-
sic responsibility is not shifted to someone else. 
The best national economic policy to ac-
company future reductions in defense spending 
is for the federal government to focus on the 
important responsibilities which are uniquely 
its own - developing sensible monetary and 
fiscal policy and reducing tax and regulatory 
obstacles to economic activity. 
Erecting that appropriate economic frame-
work is challenging in itself. Moreover, it cre-
ates the conditions that make it possible to 
achieve a truly meaningful peace dividend. 
After all, the real peace dividend is n?t ~~ly .a 
matter of changing federal budget pnonttes; 1t 
will occur when individual workers, compa-
nies, and communities successfully shift from 
military to civilian activity. 
The basic lesson that the nation learned after 
World War II, Korea, and Vietnam is still per-
tinent: Once the federal government erects an 
adequate framework in terms of a growing 
economy with expanding job opportunities, it 
should get out of the way! 
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